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ABSTRACT  
 
In 1952-7, Peryam and colleagues developed nine ordinal phrases of liking and dislike to 
assess consumers’ dispositions to accept or reject a food or drink. They named their 
questionnaire a Food Preference Scale. Others called it the Hedonic Scale, which means 
assessment of pleasure, not choice. It is still widely assumed that the word “like” 
distinguishes felt pleasure from observed wanting to consume the sample. The present 
quantitative results complement an earlier qualitative finding that preference scores do not 
provide evidence of the experiencing of pleasure. Rather, “I like it!” simply indicates high 
acceptance of the sampled variant of a product. Nevertheless, in this experiment, some 
assessors did also get a convulsive thrill from oral stimulation, as distinct from just enjoying 
the mouthful, or being pleased by it. However this sensual pleasure came only from strongly 
disliked levels of stimulation and is probably unique to samples sensed as intensely sweet.    
 
 
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS  
 
This experiment’s separation of preference from pleasure depended on overcoming 
practitioners’ division between sensory vocabulary and preference scores. Instead of seeking 
statistical patterns that bridge the supposed gap between sensory concepts and acts of 
acceptance, sensory studies should design test samples capable of measuring the impact of 
specified variations in the product range, first on a fully integrative judgment such as match 
to the personal ideal, or to the most familiar or usual brand. Second, if analytical 
characterization might help to test the specification, samples can be rated on vocabulary 
learned in life or in the laboratory, with one anchor on the standard to be matched, such 
“exactly as I like it” or “just right” (not “like extremely” or “just about right”), and only one 
other anchor, such as “neither like nor dislike” or “just too wrong to be tolerable.”  Existing 
data collection and analysis software are easily adapted this way. 151  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper reports the quantitative results from the first experiment to separate preference 
from pleasure (Booth and others 2010). The qualitative findings previously reported 
showed that it is incorrect to use the term ‘hedonic’ for scores of liking, pleasantness, relative 
acceptance or disposition to choose. The findings presented in this paper were that amount of 
pleasure does not relate monotonically to strength of preference. 
 
The whole experiment relied on an extension of previous demonstrations of the rapid 
estimation of each assessor’s ideal point and range of tolerance for a sensed characteristic of 
a familiar product in a regular usage situation. Such measurement could be central to sensory 
studies but has so far been neglected. Hence the introduction to this paper takes the space to 
specify the practicalities from basic scientific principles.   
 
The experimental session had two parts. First, each assessor’s ideal point and upper tolerance 
limit were estimated using four samples tailored to the individual’s range of acceptance. The 
second part of the session measured emotional reactions to three samples that varied among 
subsets of assessors.  For each subset, one sample was acceptable to everyone, one was close 
beyond the tolerance limit of each of those assessors, and the final sample was far into the 
region of intolerance, to extents that were varied among subsets. The data from this part of 
the session, reported numerically here, achieved the theoretically innovative result of 
separating the verbal action of preferring from the expressed reaction of experiencing a 
pleasure.  
  
 
Observed Preference or Experienced Pleasure? 
 
It is widely assumed in sensory studies and other research areas that the terms ‘like’ and 
‘dislike’ measure the subjective experience of pleasure or displeasure from some conscious 
sensation generated by the test sample. The commonest research use of these terms is to 
obtain scores on nine verbal categories from “like extremely” to “dislike extremely.” This 
layout was designed to provide grades of preference behavior in the laboratory that were 
valid on choices in the field (Peryam and Haynes 1957). Despite that intention, Peryam and 
Pilgrim (1957) chose to use the word ‘hedonic’ in the title of their paper as well as the word 
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‘preferences.’ The reason given in an earlier paper was that the words in that layout were 
already “commonly called a ‘hedonic’ scale” (Peryam and Giradot 1952).  
 
The word for pleasure in ancient Greece was hēdonē. The adjective 'hedonic' and its 
derivatives became widely used in English in the 19th century for public discussion about 
bodily pleasures among respectable people. A recent review of research using response 
layouts containing the word ‘like’ (Lim 2011) pointed out that Peryam’s intentions were 
overwhelmed by the rapid uptake of the nine ordinal categories but did not acknowledge his 
reservations about regarding preferences among foods as hedonic reactions. Peryam’s 
concession to popular jargon has done considerable harm over the subsequent decades (Booth 
and others 2010).   
 
That confusion of preference with pleasure is not confined to liking. The same strictures 
apply to the assumption that ratings of pleasantness and unpleasantness assess pleasure and 
displeasure. “It’s pleasant” is indeed synonymous with “I like it.” This equivalence supports 
the behavioral interpretation of ‘like’ and ‘dislike’. The words ‘pleasant’ and ‘unpleasant’ are  
simply latinate forms of ‘pleasing’ and ‘displeasing’. These gerunds imply enthusiastic 
engagement with an activity that involves the object being assessed  --  for example, being 
“pleased” to eat or drink the item (or being content to buy the food or fragrance). This is not a 
mere point about words. The verbiage is as it is because it handles reality effectively. When a 
culturally recognized and personally familiar sort of food item is taken into the mouth, smelt 
orthonasally, seen directly or in a picture, or merely named, it motivates or de-motivates its 
purchase and use: the item is accepted or rejected with more or less decisiveness. Whether or 
not the item also evokes affective experiences such as bodily pleasure or displeasure (or even 
pain) is an entirely different question, and one that is much more difficult to answer than has 
generally been acknowledged (Booth 1991, Booth and others 2010; contrast Cabanac 1971, 
Steiner and others 2001, and many others).  Investigators need to stop assuming that scores 
for liking or pleasantness reflect the amount of pleasure being experienced, until they get 
evidence in each study from the participants. 
 
Failure to distinguish objective motivation to eat from subjective thrills of pleasure has 
vitiated the extension to human subjects of a major finding in animal research. Movements of 
the tongue and jaw elicited by sweetness have been pharmacologically dissociated from the 
same movements continued into swallowing, which are elicited by all food and drink 
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(Berridge 1996). Those pre-ingestive movements were dubbed “hedonic.” The unwarranted 
supposition that ratings of liking or pleasantness show the strength of hedonic reaction 
(pleasure) has undermined the subsequent human research (e.g., Finlayson and others 2007, 
Hofmann and others 2010). Higher rated pleasantness merely provides further evidence of 
wanting to eat or drink the food or drink, i.e. greater motivation to consume (and swallow) 
the item.  
 
To sum up, preference and aversion are objective dispositions or tendencies to select or to 
reject the perceived entity. They are the observed conscious or unconscious motivation within 
public physical or verbal actions, not the private subjectivity of the awareness of an 
emotional reaction such as a bodily pleasure or physical displeasure or pain. 
 
 
Preference for What? 
 
How much “I like it” (or dislike the item) can only tell us what actually is attractive (or 
aversive) to that assessor when those response numbers are shown to vary with the levels of 
one or more observed features of the tested items. That is, we need to select or manipulate 
different levels of putative influences so that they vary independently of (orthogonally to) 
other potential factors, whether known (measured) or unknown (and assumed to be small 
and/or to vary randomly). If no influence is monitored and implicated in the preferring, then 
the question arises what scientific meaning or practical use could be validly derived from the 
bare scores or ranks of liking and dislike.   
 
The degree of preference is not the freestanding number scored, nor need the quantitative 
judgment have been made on what the investigators intended or assumed to be more or less 
liked about the item. Preferring is greater acceptance in action or words of the judged object 
for the sake of those features in which it is perceived by the assessor to differ from the other 
option(s). Hence a real preference cannot be measured merely by a ruler-like array of words, 
numbers and points on its own (a ‘scale’ in the jargon sense of that word: Booth, 2009a,b; 
Lim, 2011). A preference is a position on an intersecting set of mental scales of observed 
influences on degrees of acceptability. There is evidence of a sensory preference if and only 
if observed levels of sensed material characteristics of the samples are shown to have affected 
acceptance on that occasion.    
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That is to say, the notion of the strength of a preference is empirically and theoretically empty 
if there is no specification of what is preferred in one test sample over another. Scoring the 
degree of preference without context treats the objects of choice as ciphers. This is as 
unproductive as treating the chooser as an empty statistic, rather than as an individual with 
distinct attributes  --  including relative susceptibilities to different influences on choice. 
Collecting bare preference scores generates the notorious ‘fallacies of preference’ such as 
non-transferability of rank order between paired comparisons from three or more samples: 
assessors could easily be attending to different sets of features in the different pairings, 
especially when presented in different sequences.  
 
In short, a response such as liking or familiarity measures the individual assessor’s way of 
combining sensed characteristics of the tested materials, and indeed also of attributing 
concepts brought to the test or included in it (Booth and others 2011d). This contrasts sharply 
with the presumption, despite a variety of evidence long to the contrary, that sensory 
vocabulary analyzes out stimulating factors that combine additively. 
 
The experiment reported in this paper varied a single sensory characteristic in a familiar 
context and measured the levels of either preference or pleasure that it evoked. No sensory 
vocabulary was made explicit but the samples varied in concentration of a single compound, 
which was an intense sweetener. Hence the experiment was a particular test of the generic 
hypothesis that, when a user of a diet cola or a candy, for example, says “I like it!” or 
expresses a preference in some other way, s/he also has a conscious experience of a 
pleasurable sensation, such as a physical thrill at the sweetness of the drink, or of the sugar in 
the chocolate, or whatever.  
 
This test has a wider significance. The popular but dubious hedonic theory of reinforcement 
postulates that all responses are strengthened by pleasure. On such a basis, it has been 
claimed that euphoria creates drug addiction and sweetness induces food addiction. If there is 
no pleasurable thrill from the usual levels of sweetness in foods and drinks, then neither 
sugars nor sweeteners can be blamed for excessive consumption on the assumption that 
reward has a hedonic mechanism. 
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Psychological Scaling of Preference and Pleasure 
 
Pleasure cannot be distinguished from preference without accurate measurement of degrees 
of acceptance of one or more sensed characteristics of a familiar product.  Examples of such 
accuracy have been widely reported for a long time (e.g., Booth and others 1983, Conner and 
others 1986, 1988a, Booth 1988b, Booth and Conner 1991, Conner and Booth 1992, Freeman 
and others 1993, Booth and others 2003a,b). Yet the approach is still not well understood in 
applied or basic sensory research.  Hence this Introduction to the reported experiment has 
been extended to provide a full explanation of the scientific principles involved in these 
rapid, precise and therefore economic procedures.  
 
The measurement of a motive, a percept, or any other aspect of mental performance, requires  
the judged situation to be placed at a point on a causal relationship between that quantitative 
response and the amounts of the various sources of stimulation that are in fact exerting some 
influence. Assessors use the distance between a pair of verbal anchors to assess each stimulus 
selected by the experimenter. Statistical manipulation of the response data on their own, e.g., 
Thurstone scaling (Ashby and Ennis 2002), ‘internal’ preference mapping (Jaeger and others 
2000), and correlations with ordinal numbering or response positioning on other verbal 
categories (e.g., ‘external’ preference mapping: Jaeger and others 2000), can show only the 
existence of an underlying factor in the responding. It still remains to be ascertained what 
sorts of stimuli are influencing the mapped responses and how the stimulation-induced 
processes interact with each other and with the sensed and attributed context (Booth and Blair 
1989, Booth and Freeman 1993, Booth and others 2011d). Even the general character of the 
latent variable is indeterminate without some evidence of specificity from external validation, 
e.g. whether that response is intentional (motivated, such as a choice) or involuntary 
(emotional, such as a thrill of pleasure).  
 
In contrast, the present experiment met the requirements for use of a minimum number of 
data to estimate each panelist’s strengths of preference and pleasure at varied levels of 
sweetener in what they regarded as a high quality drink. There follows a brief overview of the 
specific conditions for this verbal measurement of both the objective act of preferring and 
also the subjective reaction of pleasure. 
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Layouts for Responding 
 
A quantitative response can be spatial or numerical. Spatial positions are often collected on a 
continuous line, usually with one end anchored on a wording for the apparent absence of the 
stimulus and the other on a term for an unspecified extreme (a layout widely misnamed a 
“visual analogue scale”). Such a line can be structured by unlabeled breaks, in the form of 
dashes, cups, circles or squares. Real numbers are also a continuum, on which the small 
integers are a highly practiced series of discrete positions. Hence a series of integers can be 
provided instead of or alongside a row of boxes. If the zero character (0) is assigned to one of 
two anchors and a finite integer to the other anchor, then the positions of the other integers 
are at equal ratios as well as equal intervals, at least for integers within the same order such as 
0 to 9 (e.g., Bowman and others 2004, Goodchild and others 2008, Booth and others 2011a, 
Booth 2014). Hence one of the most practical and precise response formats runs from zero 
(0), though 1, 2, 3 and so on, to a high single-digit integer. That layout was used for all the 
ratings in the experiment reported in this paper.   
 
Another example of a structured continuum is the 11-point layout of Lawless and others 
(2010b) with anchors only at the extremes, of the greatest imaginable liking and dislike. The 
number of points is a secondary consideration, although 0 to 5 may be too few if the 
psychological distance between the two extreme anchors is large relative to differences 
between some of the test samples. If the assessor is required to use integers much above 9, on 
the other hand, there is a risk of ratio biases arising from the switch between the orders of 
single digits and double digits (as also for moving from ‘percentages’ to three-figure 
numbers). These issues can only be addressed by comparisons among numbers of unlabeled 
points between and beyond the same pair of anchor phrases. Statistical differences are 
uninformative when ratings differ in ways in addition to number of points or an unbroken 
line. 
 
Two Anchors 
 
There is a fundamental scientific difficulty with the use of more than two verbal anchors on a 
layout for responses. Each adjacent pair of anchors specifies a psychological scale with a 
slope and intercept in its linear transform which may be considerably different from those of 
another pair of anchors. Hence, when the assessor places a judgment about a test sample on a 
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format with three or more anchors, the question arises of which scale is being used. Is the 
scaling of responses onto stimuli always based on the two nearest anchors, ignoring those 
further away?  Alternatively, does the scaling use only the outermost anchors?  Instead, are 
there compromise strategies?  Do the strategies vary among sets of samples?  Is there a fixed 
generic use of the multiple anchors or are the distances between adjacent anchors determinate 
only for a particular set of samples and even for each individual panelist?  The present 
experiment avoided all such difficulties by using only two anchors.  
 
The first direct psychological scaling of sensory preferences was characterized and so it was 
natural for the rating line to use three quantitative anchor phrases, “too little,” “just right” and 
“too much” (Booth and others 1983, Conner and others 1986, 1987). Hence the 
psychophysical functions on either side of the middle anchor had to be tested for differences 
in slope and intercept. Were “too little” and “too much” used by the assessor in ways that 
placed those two levels of the sensed characteristic at the same psychological distance on 
either side of the level that was “just right” (i.e., the most preferred concentration in that 
context: the ideal point)?  To avoid distortions of the scaling and hence obtain unbiased 
estimates of a consumer's ideal point and range of tolerance (from insufficiency to excess), it 
is also crucial to present samples that spread ratings evenly over the anchored range, but not 
close to an extreme anchor, and also with the first rating close to ideal (Poulton 1989). Data 
collected in accord with that bias-minimizing design showed no reliable difference between 
slopes below and above ideal (Conner and Booth 1992). This principle of co-linearity 
between pairs of anchors applies whether the degrees of preference are derived from 
categories (cp. Lawless and others 2010c) or from ratings, i.e. the positions on the line that 
are specified by each pair of adjacent anchors (cp. Ashby and Ennis 2002, Cordonner and 
Delwiche 2008).  
 
Contrary to those principles, as with many other quantitative assessments using multiple 
anchors, the ordinal categories from “like extremely” through “neither like nor dislike” to 
“dislike extremely” are often treated as equally spaced. This is despite the fact that one of the 
first published uses of Thurstone scaling of responses, by L. L. Thurstone himself, showed 
that the nine Peryam/Pilgrim categories were unevenly spaced (Jones and others 1955). 
Numerical rating without verbal anchors (Stevens 1957, but see Ellermeier and Faulhammer 
2000) has repeatedly confirmed those disparities in psychological distance between adjacent 
phrases (e.g., Moskowitz and Sidel 1971, Cardello and Schutz 2004).  
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In a paradoxical reversal of the doctrines of magnitude estimation (Stevens 1957), numerical 
ratings from limited sets of data have been averaged in order to position the anchors on a 
response line with uneven spacings (cf. Cardello and others 2008, and their citations). That 
procedure does not address the issue of how the psychological scale specified by each 
adjacent pair of anchors is used by each assessor of a particular set of samples. Hiding the 
scores or some of the phrases is no solution either, because assessors may interpret words and 
numbers between the extreme categories quite differently (Nicolas and others 2010).   
 
Such problems can be avoided by having only unlabeled points between (and beyond) a 
single pair of anchor phrases. That was the procedure used in the experiment reported here. 
 
 
Peaked Psychophysical Functions 
 
The plot of a wide enough range of levels of a sensory influence on an individual’s strength 
of preference makes it evident immediately that the function is peaked (Booth 1987). As well 
as preference being reduced by too little of a good thing, too much of that factor also lowers 
preference. The common practice of averaging or regressing raw preference scores or ranks 
across a panel of assessors is therefore a bad mistake. It artifactually flattens preference 
profiles and response surface umbrellas, in contrast to plots of counts of individuals’ peak 
preferences against levels of the sensed characteristics, e.g. the tasted salt or sugar contents of 
a food or drink (Booth and others 1983, Conner and Booth 1988; Conner and others 1988b, 
Freeman and others 1993) or its texture-generating physical properties (Booth and others 
2003a,b). Furthermore, the location of a peak of a whole panel’s average preference score 
against a physicochemical measure or a sensory panel score can be arbitrary. For example, if 
there are two or more divergent regions of popularity, there may be few individual assessors 
near that peak of average scores, and optimization to that criterion will generate a ‘lowest 
common denominator’, highly attractive to no-one. Such criticisms of averaging (or 
regressing across) bare preference responses have been made many times but the procedure 
still dominates both research publications and confidential practice. 
 
In contrast, a plot of equal ratios of a sensed material characteristic against an individual’s 
degree of preference in an otherwise ideal context gives a very sharp peak. Theoretically, in 
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otherwise perfect test samples, the function is an isosceles triangle (Booth & Conner, 1991; 
Booth and others 1983). These facts about the mental processing that decides the degree of 
preference for a food sample provide the basis for very rapid determination of the personal 
ideal point, together with the regions of rejection for intolerable insufficiency or excess of the 
constituent (Conner and others 1986, 1988a,b).  In the present experiment, such minimal data 
were crucial to the initial identification of a test sample that was close to ideal for the 
individual assessor, and also of samples close to and far beyond the excessive level that was 
just rejected by that person. All these values were derived from levels of stimuli and 
responses for only four samples that presented the varied sensory factor in an otherwise ideal 
context for each panelist.  
 
Preference versus Aversion 
 
The most important deficiency of the nine phrases of Peryam and Pilgrim (1957) for 
theoretical and practical purposes is their bipolar disorder, from extreme liking to extreme 
dislike. Rating from “extremely pleasant” to “extremely unpleasant” has the same limitations. 
A measure of food preferences should not be concerned with food aversions as well. What is 
liked in foods having their usual sensed characteristics and conceptualized attributes is often 
quite different from what is disliked, such as a tainting compound (Mottram 1998) or an 
named identity that provokes a fear of being made ill (Knibb and others 2001).  
  
In addition, there is a logical asymmetry between “like extremely” and “dislike extremely.” 
The psychological scale for a preferred constituent is peaked, whereas that for an aversive 
constituent comes at most to an asymptote at receptor saturation, without ever declining as 
preference does at excessive levels. Hence, among ordinary foods, preference extends to an 
absolute maximum, when the sample is ideal or “just right.” The word ‘ideal’ means that no 
sample could be liked more. That category provides a precise anchor for the preference 
responses, whereas “extremely liked” does not constrain the panelist between something that 
is strongly preferred but not ideal and the self-contradictory concept that the sample is more 
preferred than the ideal version.  
 
Dislike, on the other hand, has no clear maximum in the usual ranges of aversive stimuli. 
Hence no familiar standard level can be invoked. The phrase “extremely disliked” leaves 
each panelist free to pick her or his own criterion of extreme.  Even “as unpleasant as 
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imaginable” is vague: it is ambiguous between being as unpleasant as such a sample can be 
imagined to be (e.g., as bitter as at the saturation of the receptors) and as unpleasant as 
anything could be (e.g., scaled onto unbearable physical pain). 
 
In addition, the scoring of liking from 6 to 9 in the same set of data as dislike is scored from 4 
to 1 can have dire consequences. Averaging such scores across groups has blinded 
investigators to the difference between an increase in preference and a decrease in aversion. 
For example, plain tomato soup of modest quality could be somewhat disliked by some 
people. Adding a little herbal flavoring might make it less intolerable to them. Averaged in 
with a larger number of people who quite liked the plain version and did not find that the herb 
flavor improved its quality, this could give a group increase from indifferent to slightly liked. 
It would not follow that the flavoring increased palatability in any individual, let alone as a 
generalization across everyone.    
 
For the above reasons, preference and aversion should be assessed separately. One of these 
two assessments could often be redundant: everywhere in the range of substantial preference 
is liable to go with zero aversion, and vice versa. The present experiment exploited the 
linearity of preference scales within the tolerable range above ideal and so only degrees of 
preference needed to be measured, with intolerably high levels of sweetening being estimated 
by extrapolation of the theoretical straight line.   
 
The panelist’s degree of preference for each sample was expressed in a response placed on a 
position between ideal (“always choose,” scored as zero) and either just too little or too much 
at the same position (“never choose,” scored by the investigators as 9 although any number 
would serve). The stimulus values at points interpolated between of ideal and just rejected are 
what need to be compared across individuals and panels, not the raw numbers that panelists 
or investigators assigned to the responses at those particular values. This report provides such 
a panel-wide profile of sweetener ideals and tolerances in the tested beverage for the market 
represented. 
 
The present experiment followed the same principle of unipolarity by assessing pleasure and 
displeasure separately, in identical formats but differing appropriately in the vocabulary of 
the two anchors. Lack of either polarity of emotional reaction was rated and scored as zero. A 
degree of either positive or negative affect was assigned a single-digit integer by the panelist 
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that the investigators used as the score. No word was used that was liable to be ambiguous 
between pleasure and preference, such as “like” or “pleasant.”   
 
 
Influences of Sweetener Levels on Preference and Pleasure 
 
A person’s overall liking for a particular food is driven by a distinctive learnt configuration of 
sensed and symbolic influences (Booth and Freeman 1993, Knibb and others 2001, 
Moskowitz 2002, Freeman and Booth 2010). This paper reports data from variations in 
concentration of only an intense sweetener, added to a fruit juice. That manipulation induced 
differences in the sourness of the juice as well as its sweetness, but there were no variations 
in texture or osmolarity as with sweetening by a sugar, especially at the high concentrations 
that might be needed in the present paradigm. Sweetness is no different from any other 
sensory characteristic or symbolic attribute within the individual’s ideal configuration or 
norm: the most preferred intensity in a food or drink varies widely among foods and drinks 
and across people (Conner and others 1986, 1988b).   
 
On the other hand, we and other omnivorous mammals are born with reflexive movements 
that help mother’s milk down the infant’s throat. As with all reflexes, the response becomes 
steadily stronger as the stimulus becomes more intense (Thompson and Spencer 1966) -- in 
this case, “the sweeter the better.” This congenital reflex is suppressed by the learning from 
infancy onwards of a personal norm for the sweetness of a particular food or drink (together 
with norm values for all its other perceived features). Nevertheless, if the neural connections 
of the reflex persist into adulthood, sufficiently strong sweetness could in principle break 
through the learnt decline in preference as sweetness increases above ideal (Booth 1991, 
Booth and Shepherd 1988). Clear evidence for such an effect has recently been found: tasters 
of a popular fruit juice wrote about movements in the mouth that are characteristic of the 
reflex when the juice was given a revoltingly strong sweetness and may also have been made 
bitter to some assessors (Booth and others 2010). Furthermore, the sensations of movement 
were enjoyed more, and overall mood was raised higher, the further above ideal the 
sweetness was raised (Booth and others 2010). That is, there was a pleasurable reflexive 
response to the taste of a sweetener at rejected levels. This experimental paradigm had 
distinguished for the first time a sensual pleasure at sweetness itself from a fully 
contextualized preference for that taste in a familiar material.  
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This paper presents previously unreported data from that experiment (Booth and others 
2010). The earlier paper related categories of spontaneous wording for felt movements to 
indicators of preference and pleasure across relevantly selected assessors. Here the 
correlations between the measures of preference and pleasure are considered across whole 
panels tested on different levels of unacceptably strong sweetness. Within any one body of 
data, correlations are statistically independent from frequencies or central tendencies. 
 
 
Hypotheses 
 
The hypotheses tested in this paper are factual, not methodological. The findings use 
psychological scales of an influence on a variety of responses in order to advance empirical 
knowledge. They do not develop procedures for collecting responses. In other words, this 
paper is ‘psychophysical’: it measures sensitivity to influences. It is not ‘psychometric’: it 
does not seek multivariate latent factors among diversely worded responses (Booth 1995).  
  
The first part of the experiment reported here tested the hypothesis that there is a linear 
relationship between the ratio steps of a sweetener above the panelist’s ideal point for a 
familiar drink (tested during regular thirst). The strength of preference was placed at a point 
between the anchors of always choosing to have a drink of the tasted sample and the sample 
being just too sweet for use as a full drink. Confirmation of the hypothesized linearity was 
relied on to generate estimates of four concentrations of sweetener that were categorized 
across the panel as generally near ideal, approaching unacceptably too sweet, definitely 
unacceptable, or a strength that was completely intolerable in the drink. 
 
The second part of the experiment correlated those group-specified levels of preference or 
aversion with individual panelists’ performance on each of two indirect assessments of 
pleasurable affect. One index was improvement in overall good mood. The other indicator 
was enjoyment of sensations of movement in the mouth or face while tasting the test sample.  
It was hypothesized that there would generally be no linear relation between preference and 
pleasure, because they are separate phenomena. A correlation between preference and 
pleasure was envisaged only at such extreme sweetness (possibly with some bitterness too) 
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that the decline in preference was associated with suppression also of pleasure and/or its 
replacement with displeasure. 
 
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 
The panelists were 50 young women and men studying at college or university. The 
experiment was designed to analyze people’s performance regardless of background. Hence 
no assessment was made of the socio-demographic representativeness of this opportunity 
sample. Each panelist professed to be familiar with the brand of apple juice used and 
consented to drinking test samples of juice that varied in normal constituents of the diet, 
including artificial sweeteners. 
 
 
Test Samples 
 
Each tested sample was a mixture of equal volumes of fresh juice from pressed apples and a 
re-sweetened and re-acidulated dialyzate of that juice. Bottles of the apple juice (Copello 
brand) were purchased at a Sainsbury retailer 2-3 days before use and mixed into a single 
batch before the preparation of samples for a day of tests. Glucose and malic acid were added 
back to the dialyzed juice to give a sweetness and sourness that could not be distinguished by 
the investigators from that of the marketed juice. The intense sweetener varied in 
concentration among samples was saccharin, which has always had regulatory approval in 
Europe. The samples were presented at room temperature.  
 
 
Rating Formats 
 
Preference Behavior  
 
In the first part of the experiment, in 16 panelists, used personally bias-minimized sets of test 
samples to assess behavioral preference for each juice by marking a box in a vertical array of 
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15 boxes, under the question “How much would you like to drink a whole glass of juice 
tasting like this (if you wanted a drink of apple juice at the time)?”  The top box was labeled 
“I’d always want to have a glass of this” (ideal point, IP, scored zero). The only other anchor 
was next to the eleventh box down, “Just not good enough ever to choose.” Below that 
rejection point (RP), well away from the row of boxes, was an arrow pointing downward, 
labeled “even worse to make a drink out of.” Beneath the bottommost box was a line on 
which to write the number of boxes needed if the drink sample was that bad. The personally 
tailored selection of sweetener levels endeavored not to go beyond the individual’s RP and so 
that option was never taken. The score for the rejection point and the number of boxes are of 
no significance, so long as the primary anchor has a zero score (Booth and Freeman 1993) 
and there are at least four points between anchors (or a continuous line).  The use of only two 
anchors with one of them scored zero makes linear responding possible, with scores having 
both interval and ratio properties, i.e. full measurement is achieved.  
 
These panelists were pre-adapted to the format without transfer of response habits other than 
direction, by assessing a sample of the marketed juice for “sweetness,” “sourness” and 
“overall taste” on horizontal rows of boxes, otherwise identical to the row for rated choice but 
with the leftmost box labeled “not at all sweet,” “not at all sour” or “as weak as water” 
respectively and the anchor “exactly like apple juice” always placed at the array’s middle 
box.   
 
Pleasurable Experience 
 
The second part of the experiment on other panelists used sweetener concentrations that were 
fixed across a panel for their general effect on preference. Any pleasure or displeasure 
evoked by each drink sample was measured indirectly in two distinct ways, one generic and 
one specific to taste compounds. 
 
The generic method assessed the separate effects of each sweetener level on arrays headed 
“good mood” (positive affect) or “bad mood” (negative affect). A single bipolar format was 
avoided because the distinction between an intensification of good mood and a weakening of 
bad mood is difficult to make within the individual, and impossible in grouped data with 
means near neutral. The panelist was asked to put one dash on each of two adjacent vertical 
arrays of eight short vertical lines with substantial spaces between them. The top line of an 
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array (scored 7) was labeled “as good as imaginable” (left-hand array) or “as bad as 
imaginable” (right-hand array). The lowest line (scored 0) was labeled “no improvement” for 
positive affect and “no worsening in how I feel” for negative affect. 
 
Those ratings of general positive or negative affect were preceded by the assessment reported 
previously, of immediate emotional reaction to any movement felt in the mouth of face 
(Booth and others 2010).  The first question read while tasting a sample was “How nice 
and/or nasty is the muscular reaction in your mouth?” Below were two horizontal rows of the 
numbers 0 to 7. The first row had “not at all nice” against the zero and “as nice as I could 
imagine” against the seven. In the second line, 0 was labeled “not nasty at all” and 7 “as nasty 
as I could imagine.” The instruction was to circle one of the numbers in each line. 
 
After that, the panelist was asked to use her or his own words to describe the nice and/or 
nasty mouth movements just rated. Those particular data have been reported in full (Booth 
and others 2010). Only the group means of ratings of good or bad mood and of nice or nasty 
movement were given in the earlier paper. Here the complementary information in the data is 
presented, i.e. correlations between the ratings, and of each rating with the levels of 
sweetener used in the samples. The ratings of mood came last and then the assessor prepared 
for the next sample. 
 
Assessment Procedures 
 
In the first part of the main experiment, with 19 panelists divided between two sessions, 
always/never choose ratings only were elicited for five to seven samples of apple juice that 
were varied in content of saccharin or malic acid in order to control their sweetness relative to 
their sourness (Conner and others 1986). The main known stimulus biases across a session on 
ratings were minimized by personal tailoring of the sequence of concentrations presented 
(Conner and others 1988a,b). Centering bias (Poulton 1989) was avoided by presenting first a 
sweetness close to marketed, i.e. the lowest step of either saccharin or malic acid (alternately 
between successive assessors). Range and frequency biases (Conner and others 1987, 
Parducci 1965, Riskey and others 1979) were minimized by presenting higher steps of 
saccharin or malic acid alternately until a larger gap in rating appeared on one side of ideal, 
when a sample was selected that was likely to elicit a rating in the gap.  End effects (cp. 
Lawless and others 2010a) were avoided by selecting the second sample on the other side of 
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marketed sweetness from the first rating by no more than two steps and then selecting the 
third and subsequent samples to minimize the risk of a rating beyond “never choose” because 
under-sweet or over-sweet. Furthermore, the phrase “never choose” was not an end-anchor; 
options for response were provided well beyond it. It should be noted that first-order 
sequence biases, i.e. effects of one sample on the rating of the next, have no measurable 
group effect on this sort of data (Conner and Booth 1992).  
 
From these sets of individual data, a concentration of saccharin (0.1 mg per 100 ml; Step 0.1) 
was identified that was close to ideal sweetness for this juice (“always choose”) in all the 
panelists. A higher concentration approached just too sweet more or less closely (2 mg %; 
Step 2) or was slightly beyond it (3 mg %; Step 3). Still higher concentrations of saccharin 
were not tested in these initial experiments because the data from the ‘too much’ side of the 
individuals’ preference triangles demonstrated that they must be intolerably sweet in this 
apple juice for anybody (Booth and Conner 1992).  
 
In the second part of the experiment with 31 other panelists, just four samples of apple juice 
were presented in a fixed sequence in order to assess any pleasure or displeasure evoked by 
the sweetener at the different levels of behavioral preference or aversion. First, the level (Step 
0.1) was presented that was close to the various concentrations rated “always choose” by the 
earlier assessors (their ideal points). An intermediate level close to never choose (just 
intolerably too sweet) was presented second (Steps 2 or 3). The third sample contained a 
concentration of malic acid instead of saccharin that had been rated by the earlier panelists as 
over halfway from ideal sweetness to being too little sweet ever to choose; this under-sweet 
(sour) juice was presented only in order to help to balance the oversweet samples and so the 
responses are not relevant to the hypothesis and the data are not shown.  The final sample was 
intolerably over-sweet, varied among Steps 8, 4 and 3 in panels of 14, 7 and 10 panelists 
respectively. 
 
Analysis of Data 
  
The choice ratings and saccharin concentrations from each individual in the initial panels 
were fitted by least squared deviates regression to the vertical conic section (hyperbola) of 
contextualized preference (Booth and Freeman 1993) using a software tool programmed by 
Dr Oliver Sharpe to those specifications for biosocial analysis of cognitive processes and 
 19  
consumer products (Co-Pro 2.29). The tool’s output included each assessor’s ideal point (IP) 
for saccharin in the apple juice while thirsty (the concentration that would be rated “always 
choose”) and the unsigned slope of the isosceles triangle of tangents to the hyperbola (see 
Figure 1 in Results). From that linear equation above the IP, the excess rejection point for 
each individual was calculated, i.e. the concentration of saccharin that would have been rated 
“never choose.” The slope and mean square error gave the half-discriminated ratio (HDR) of 
saccharin concentrations (one plus Weber’s fraction; the Tolerance Discrimination Ratio of 
Conner and others 1988a,b, and the JND of Torgerson 1958).  One HDR either side of the IP 
is the individual assessor’s ideal range of the sensed constituent in the sensory, somatic and 
social context of testing (see Figure 2 in Results).  
 
Inferential statistics were calculated in SPSS 16.0. Graphs not from the output of Co-Pro 
were constructed in SigmaPlot 11.0.  
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Measurement of Personal Preferences for Sweetener Levels in Apple Juice 
 
The design was remarkably efficient at estimating each assessor’s ideal and excess rejection 
points using only four samples of juice (Figure 1), in line with previous experience of this 
approach (Booth and others 1983, Conner and others 1986, 1987). In the two panels 
combined in Figure 1, only one assessor gave the same rating (“always choose”) to each of 
the four saccharin levels (not shown) and one other gave only two different ratings (leftmost 
panel of the third row, Figure 1). The other 17 assessors gave three or four distinct ratings of 
degree of preference. Every assessor in the Figure showed the right-hand limb of the 
hypothetical peaked function of sweetener concentration ratio, as the design was intended to 
achieve. Half the assessors had their ideal point within the range of the data. The ideal point 
for each of the others could be estimated by extrapolation. 
Figure 1 about here 
 
The profile of ideal ranges was similarly orderly (Figure 2). The visual appearance of skew to 
low concentrations and a tail of high concentration is belied by the closeness of the mean 
[setter: these hyphens are minus signs] (-2.19) to the median (-2.18) of ideal points, i.e. about 0.15 
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mg of saccharin per 100 ml of juice. It should be noted that the appearance of the extremes of 
a plot of ideal ranges are dominated by the poorest discriminators between “always choose” 
and “never choose” --  that is, by those who care least about deviations from their ideal 
sweetness in apple juice. The finest discriminators  --  that is, the pickiest selectors among 
sweetness levels  --  were clustered in the range [setter: the next two hyphens are minus signs] -2.25 
to -2.00 (Figure 2). In other words, this middle region of the profile also provided the reliable 
mode of popularity, close to the mean of the ideals.  
Figure 2 about here 
 
Since equal ratios of a physical measure are equally well discriminated in a medium range, 
the saccharin concentrations have to be on a ratio scale (in logarithms) in order to generate a 
normal distribution of ideal points (Conner and Booth 1992, Conner and others 1988a,b). 
Hence the miniscule concentrations at the lower ends of the widest ideal ranges (down to a 
few micrograms of saccharin in 100 ml) merely mean that no saccharin was needed in the 
juice formulation that was held constant. Indeed, less of the inherent fructose and glucose, or 
more of the malic acid in apples, would have been tolerated or even preferred by people with 
an ideal point around -2.5 (lower mode, Figure 2), perhaps corresponding to those with the 
low ‘sweet tooth’ of fruit eaters and juice drinkers (Conner and Booth 1988, Conner and 
others 1988b, Freeman and others 1993, Wansink and others 2006). 
 
The saccharin concentrations extrapolated upwards to be at the “never choose” anchor in 
these 18 assessors (functions in Figure 1) had a median of 1.2 mg % (quartiles 1.1 and 1.4). 
Therefore in the second part of the experiment, the concentrations of saccharin presented 
were 0.001 g/l (Step 0.1) as a near maximally preferred level, Step 2 or 3 as near the point of 
being too sweet (0.02 g/l being likely to be a little less sweet than just “never choose” and 
0.03 g/l liable to be definitely too sweet) and Steps 3, 4 or 8 as much too sweet. The saccharin 
at Step 8 (0.08 g/l) could have tasted bitter to a substantial proportion of the sample, and 
perhaps to some even at Step 4. It should be noted that this design does not average 
preferences scores.  (No ratings of preference were made by the subpanels reported in the 
next sections of Results with Figures 3 to 6.) The Step numbers were surrogates for the 
central tendencies of narrow distributions of positions on the psychological scale of 
sweetness preference specified by maximum and minimum dispositions to choose among 
previous volunteers from the same population (Figures 1 and 2).  
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Measurement of Pleasure and Displeasure 
Pleasure and displeasure could be measured indirectly in two ways in the present sets of 
samples of apple juice with saccharin added. A generic measure was the immediate effect of 
tasting the sample on mood. A sweet-specific measure was the affective evaluation of 
impressions of movement in the mouth or face while tasting a sample. 
 
These two measures had considerable cross-validity, especially in positive affect (pleasure). 
The correlations between the two sorts of rating were highest in the panel tasting very strong 
saccharin (Step 8), where the shared variance (r2) reached 74% (top left cell in Table 1 and 
Figure 3). Good mood was reliably correlated with a nice feeling of movement also in the 
subpanels presented juice with lower levels of the strongest saccharin (across the row in 
Table 1 and down the column in Figure 3). In those circumstances, however, there was a 
tendency for nice movement to occur without an improvement in mood. That is, the 
pleasurable impressions of muscular reactions to sweetness were sometimes elicited but this 
reaction was too focused to affect overall mood. Also there were signs of categorical rather 
than graded behavior with these more moderate ranges of saccharin: mood particularly was 
rated as either very good (5 or 6 out of 7 for “extremely good”) or as neutral or slightly good 
(0 to 2).  
Table 1 and Figure 3 about here 
 
Similarly with displeasure, these two measures showed the best cross-validity with the most 
extreme top concentration of saccharin (second row of Table 1 and right-hand column of 
Figure 3). Overall, the ratings of displeasure tended to be lower that the ratings of pleasure, as 
to be expected with a high-quality drink and the taste of sweetness. Indeed, when all three 
concentrations of saccharin were tolerable to many assessors, the great majority of ratings of 
the felt movement were zero displeasure and worsening of bad mood rated zero or 1 out of 7. 
 
Relationships between Preference/Aversion and Pleasure/Displeasure 
 
Preference and Mood 
The second part of the experiment did not repeat the measurements of preference, in the 
interests of rapid collection of wordings of felt movements in the mouth and face (Booth and 
others 2010) and then the ratings of affect that are analyzed by correlations in this paper.  
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Instead, each subpanel of assessors tasted a different top concentration of saccharin. The 
result was that panels varied greatly in the relationship between predicted preference/aversion 
and observed expression of pleasure/displeasure.  
 
When a very high concentration of saccharin (Step 8) was included among the three levels 
(left-most column of data in Table 1), the decline in choice with excess of sweetness 
represented by that Step number correlated reliably with mood, both negatively with good 
mood and also positively with bad mood (third and fourth cells). Including this exceedingly 
sweet sample (probably bitter too for some) induced good and bad moods that shared almost 
50% of their variance (fifth cell, leftmost column, Table 1), a stronger correlation than of 
either good or bad mood with preference. The scatterplots make plain what was going on 
(Figure 4).   
Figure 4 about here  
 
The near-ideal Step 0.1 of sweetener was very cheering to almost everyone (top left plot in 
Figure 4), while Step 3 (just at or beyond “never choose”) was less so. In most assessors, 
neither of these steps induced any bad mood (mid-left scatterplot, Figure 4).  
 
In contrast, on tasting Step 8 some assessors expressed little or no good mood and they were 
all put into a bad mood  --  many strongly so. These data do not distinguish between a 
revoltingly extreme sweetness and a bitter taste of the saccharin at this level, or even a 
mixture of both for some assessors. Clearly though, any innate pleasure at sweetness had to 
contend with some powerfully aversive reactions.  
 
The two scatterplots were almost mirror images, accounting for their high correlation.  At the 
same time, Step 8 induced a large deviation from linearity of mood with choice, giving those 
more modest correlations.  
 
The other two subpanels showed no reliable correlations between choice preference and 
mood (third and fourth data lines, Table 1). The assessors tested on a less extreme but still 
strongly rejected concentration of saccharin (Step 4) produced a trough of good mood that 
mirrored a peak of bad mood at Step 2 (Figure 5), generating a small negative correlation 
between good and bad mood (Table 1). A good number of assessors were cheered by tasting 
the near ideal sweetness (Step 0.1; top left plot in Figure 5). A minority showed the sign of 
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innate pleasure in improved good mood on tasting Step 4. Most experienced little or no bad 
mood either near ideal or at reflex-inducing rejected sweetness. However, on tasting the level 
of sweetness approaching “never choose,” half the panel rated worsening of mood at 5 out of 
7 for “extremely bad.”  That is, they expressed considerable displeasure. 
Figure 5 about here  
 
The preference-mood functions were effectively flat when all three levels of sweetener were 
ideal or tolerable (Figure 6). Bad mood was rare in this subpanel but, at each of these Steps of 
saccharin, a substantial proportion rated moderately large improvement in good mood (4 to 6 
out of 7 for “extremely good”). This finding is consistent with a correlation between 
preference and pleasure arising only when an aversively tasting sample is included.   
Figure 6 about here 
 
 
Movement Affect and Drink Sweetness Preference 
There were many close parallels between the effects on general mood and effects on the 
enjoyment of feelings of movement in the mouth or face (right-hand columns of Figures 4-6). 
This detailed concordance provides further cross-validation of these two sorts of index of 
pleasure and displeasure.  
 
That broad validity makes a disparity all the more striking. “Nice” and “nasty” feelings of 
movement were uniquely highly correlated (80% shared variance) in the panel tasting 
saccharin that was intolerably sweet (Step 4) but far less extreme than Step 8 and yet also not 
within the tolerated range as Step 3 more often would have been (last cell of middle data 
column of Table 1; bottom right-hand plot of Figure 5). It is therefore of some importance 
that this measure also showed no relationship between preference and pleasure in this panel 
(the two cells above in Table 1). Hence, even with separate unipolar assessments, a 
relationship between motivation and emotion is an artifact of including a highly aversive 
sample in the set.  
 
The high correlations between niceness and nastiness of movement in the other two 
subpanels were less meaningful because they arose largely from categorical behavior: a 
movement was rated as either both substantially nice and not at all nasty, or nasty and not 
nice (bottom right of Figures 4 and 6). Nevertheless, the categorization of pleasure or 
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displeasure in the felt movement sustained the shape of the function of choice preference that 
was seen with mood (compare right-hand with left-hand upper two plots of Figures 4-6). 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
Separation of Preference and Pleasure 
 
When the tested samples of apple juice included only mildly intolerable levels of over-
sweetness, there was no correlation between the direct measure of preference and either of 
the two indirect measures of pleasure. That lack of a monotonic relationship is evidence that 
there is a phenomenon of pleasurable experience induced by the taste of a sweetener which is 
distinct from a preference shown for one level of sweetness over another within a high-
quality beverage.  
 
Those ratings of preference relative to ideal for variants of a particular food or drink provide 
a highly economical way of measuring the strength of influence of any factor in food choice 
behavior (Conner and others 1986). In the present experiment, just four samples were 
sufficient to estimate nearly all the untrained panelists’ ideal points and excess rejection 
points for the sweetener in a familiar juice. The one exception was indifferent to levels of 
sweetener in the range tested and might have produced a measurable preference function if a 
more strongly sour or sweet sample had been included.  
 
In contrast to such ease of measuring an influence on preference, there are inevitable 
difficulties in assessing pleasure. No known wording by itself can pick out pleasure from 
preference, and so that job must be done less directly. The logically simplest evidence for any 
hypothetical construct is converging operations from two different effects of that mediating 
variable. Futhermore, each of those indicators of pleasure has to be disconfounded from 
preference under the conditions of testing. This report illustrates one way of running such an 
experimental design.  
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It may be questioned whether it is worth tackling these experimental complexities. Sheer 
curiosity is of course legitimate but its pursuit may be difficult to resource.  Is genuinely 
hedonic assessment of any practical value?  Expected sensory factors are likely to dominate 
most choices of foods, but sometimes emotions may play a part (Macht 2008).  In some 
circumstances, the links between the senses and the emotions may be critical. 
 
Food and Mood 
 
Hence one reason to investigate experiences of pleasure as distinct from the disposition to 
accept is clarify the emotional functions of food consumption. Experiencing a pleasure could 
create or boost an overall good mood. Also, pleasure might counter a bad mood if one existed 
at the time.  Indeed, one of this paper’s indirect assessments of pleasure was the strength of 
“good” mood. A separate assessment of the intensity of “bad” mood might improve 
understanding of the overall affective state.  
 
In addition, it may be worth attempting to differentiate among types of positive affect (Sauter 
2010). However, the respondent’s actual mood is not identified simply by a word that the 
investigator uses (Goodchild and others 2005).  Once again, experimental designs are needed 
that use converging operations on products having known variations.  
 
A possibility worth further investigation is that sensual pleasure comes from elicited 
movements, not just straight from the stimulation. The second indirect assessment of pleasure 
in this paper was enjoyment of those particular movements that become more likely with 
increasing stimulation, or even of just an impression that the movements occurred (Booth and 
others 2010).  In the present case of strong sweetness, the sensual pleasure might therefore be 
based at least partly on sensing or imagining the ingestive movements of the tongue that are 
stimulated in the human baby by sugar (Rosenstein and Oster 1988). Analogously, 
displeasure might be generated from grimaces at bitter or sour tastes (Rosenstein and Oster 
1988). The convergence of this implicit index of pleasure with the mood ratings in the present 
experiment supports such conjectures, as also does the analysis of the verbalized concepts of 
movement in the mouth and face (Booth and others 2010). 
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Strategies for Practice 
 
The success of the method for separating preference from pleasure presented here and earlier 
(Booth and others 2010) has wide implications for sensory studies.  These considerations 
range from the design of response scales to the selection of products to test. 
 
Response Categories 
 
It is over sixty years since Peryam and colleagues proposed that scores for food preference in 
the market be elicited by nine ordinal categories ranging from very strong liking to very 
strong dislike (Jones and others 1955, Peryam and Girardot 1952, Peryam and Haynes 1957, 
Peryam and Pilgrim 1957). The layout was immediately popular and remains the most 
commonly used tool for the assessment of preference in both academic and commercial 
research, either in its original form or modified in various ways (e.g., Bartoshuk and others 
2006, Schutz 1965, Schutz and Cardello 2001; see review by Lim 2011).  Nevertheless there 
are major difficulties in constructing usefully quantitative preference functions from the 
responses made in any bipolar multiple-category format. These issues were detailed in the 
Introduction in order to justify the responses used in the present experiment. Additional 
practical implications are considered now.  
 
The evidence and argument in this paper provide clear pointers to the most effective use of 
Peryam’s categories for the measurement of food preference behavior. The bipolar mid-
category of “neither like nor dislike” could be the lower of two anchor points for an otherwise 
unlabelled array of degrees of preference. To serve as the one other anchor, the phrase “like 
extremely” needs to be changed to refer explicitly to the logical maximum of liking, the ideal 
point, e.g. “could not be liked more” or “maximally liked.”  That phrase would anchor the 
ratings on the personally most preferred variant of the assessed sort of food in the use that the 
test session simulates. Even if some other factors in a test sample are below optimum for a 
panelist, the psychophysics of preference provides the means to estimate that ideal point and 
how far any tested or untested sample is from it (Booth and Freeman 1993, Booth and others 
2003a,b).  
 
Multiple anchor phrases are good only for surveys of relative popularity of directly 
competing products. Such data must be analyzed only as counts of respondents at each 
 27  
anchor. It would be no more difficult for consumers to place items in positions between two 
phrases such as “could not like more” and “neither like nor dislike.” Then preferences can be 
measured on psychological scales by simply programmed calculations. Separate placing of 
responses between “greatest dislike imaginable” and “neither liked nor disliked” can screen 
for any incidence of antagonism to a product in the population represented by the panel.  
More realistic pairs of anchors for preference invoke the act of selection of the rated sample 
from the alternatives considered by the assessor, such as “I’d always choose one like this in 
this context” and “I never would.”   
 
Wanting a food or drink (appetite for the item) is a contextualized preference. That is, the 
attractiveness of a food increases with closeness to a usual situation for eating it. The 
attraction also decreases as that item and other foods are eaten. Hence if a substantial number 
of items are consumed in a session, aversiveness or at least a transient loss of preference 
should also be screened for. “I’m full” need not refer to a sensation of stretch within the 
abdomen; it may simply mean that the speaker wants to stop eating whatever is available 
(Booth 1976, Booth and others 1982). Young children have to learn such conventions for 
satiety and its expression (Laurier and Wiggins 2011). In the same way, they learn which 
foods in which eating situations have the sensed characteristics and the conceptualized 
attributes to be selected right then. Both rumbling or distended stomachs and also sensual 
pleasure or displeasure can be by-the-by (Booth and Blair 1979). Consumption tests need to 
be monitored for accumulating satiety in anybody, as well as initial unacceptability in some.  
 
Hence for theoretical or practical use of data on preferences, the questioning should at the 
very least focus on eating or shopping. Better, the main factors in a particular situation 
requiring the decision should be specified (Cardello and others 2000). The measurement of 
preference would be much more effective if the whole situation, material and social, were 
mimicked as closely as possible. Assessment of liking in the abstract carries the unrealistic 
preconception of a food with a context-free ‘palatability’, or indeed a fixed satisfaction or 
satiating power (Booth 1990b). Hence, both to make scientific sense and for application in 
health or commerce, a measure of the strength of the disposition to select a food needs to 
incorporate measures of the momentary influences on the observed response.  
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Preference as the First Sensory Measure 
 
Whether characterized or not, degree of preference or relative acceptance is an integrative 
measure of sensory impact. It reflects the actual interactions among sensed factors.  
Moreover, these mental interactions include the context of conceptual attributes that each 
panelist brings to the test session. In addition, the investigator generates attributions during 
instructions or in labels like those used in conjoint analysis, including sensory expectations.  
For example, identical drinks of coffee, varied only in caffeine content, were liberated from 
conceptualization as varying in bitterness by asking panelists to rate each “brand” of coffee 
(Booth and others 2011b,c). 
 
In short, preferences are no less sensory than are sensory intensities. Indeed, for many 
purposes, the integrative sensitivity of preference is much more useful than the putatively 
analytical sensitivity of a sensory vocabulary. There is certainly no need to bridge a supposed 
gap between sensory concepts and acts of acceptance by collecting large amounts of 
unfocused data to be mined for statistical patterns. 
 
Characterized preferences are no different from characterized intensities.  The use of a verbal 
concept may improve sensitivity to a sensed factor if that concept provides a good 
description, but it could worsen sensitivity if another verbal concept works better for that 
panelist (Booth 2011a, Booth and others 2011a, Booth and Freeman 2014). 
 
Selection of Items for Testing 
 
The impact of sensing can only be assessed by picking out samples that contrast in levels of 
each ingredient or instrumental measure independently of others. This is the basic principle of 
causal analysis. Hence a sensory study conducted for business purposes should be designed to 
test specific hypotheses about consumers’ action on the bundle of sensed and attributed 
features that constitute the (sub)branded product under investigation.   
 
The test samples need to be selected into a set capable of measuring the impact of 
hypothesized variations in the product range, first on a fully integrative judgment such as 
match to personally ideal, most familiar or usual brand, and then on user or expert generated 
vocabulary if some analytical characterization might help to test an hypothesis.  Neither the 
 29  
number of samples nor the size of the analytical vocabulary should be larger than needed to 
fill any gaps in the evidence on the originally formulated hypotheses that have been generated 
by personal preference or familiarity. 
 
The present results show that a correlation between preference/aversion and 
pleasure/displeasure can be an artifact of including an aversive test sample.  When only 
marketable samples were tested, there was no correlation between the usual preference and 
individual pleasure.  That fact is important in itself if consumers’ actions are what matter, 
rather than unrelated phenomenology. However, the observation also has strategic 
importance, especially if testing has not been tailored to panelists. The panel’s data should 
not be grouped for analysis without screening for anomalous panelists or test products. If 
ranks or quantities range from preference to aversion, aversion to one or more of the samples 
may go unnoticed. Liking and dislike should be rated separately, so that the situation is plain 
at the panel level as well as in each panelist.  
 
Dangers from the Unique Impact of Sweetness 
 
The present results strengthen the evidence that, without properly conducted sensory 
optimization, there can be serious dangers to both users and producers of foods and drinks 
containing intense or bulk sweeteners. We are born with a reflex that draws material into the 
mouth with increasing vigor as its sweet taste get stronger, without limit.  Ordinarily “the 
sweeter the better” is suppressed by the universal mechanism of learning to like whatever 
becomes familiar in physiologically and socially congenial circumstances. A particular food 
or drink consumed in a usual situation is most accepted when its sweetness and every other 
feature are at the levels remembered from previous occasions (Booth and Freeman 1993, 
Booth and others 2011b).  
 
In newborn infants, the sweetness of human milk elicits the unlearned reflex which helps to 
ensure that fluid goes straight from the breast to the throat.  Yet the baby probably learns 
rapidly to prefer breastmilk’s level of sweetness (and levels of sodium salts, viscosity, 
warmth and aroma) over either less or more. Certainly the weanling acquires a preference for 
the level of each taste in each food provided (Harris and Booth 1987).   
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If child or adult consumers are not presented with extra sweet drinks or foods, they will not 
come to like them (Conner and Booth 1988, Conner and others 1988b, Wansink and others 
2006). Worse, if they are presented with sufficiently strong sweetness, the infantile milk 
acceptance reflex is liable to break through. Hence, even the young adults whose experience 
of natural levels of sugars and acids has taught them that extremely sweet apple juice is 
revolting, as observed in the present experiment (Booth and others 2010), may be inveigled 
into trying a super-sweet drink again because of an oral thrill from that taste.  
 
Enjoyment without Thrills 
 
Finally, those who would like sensual pleasure to be the usual experience with any food or 
drink should consider the implications of the fact that evidence of the experience of pleasure 
was obtained in this experiment with intolerably over-sweet samples. Of course, strong 
expressions of pleasure in food can be appropriate in some social situations. There is no 
doubt either that the activity of eating can be intensely enjoyable. The question posed by this 
report is whether eating is normally accompanied by physical thrills. A climactic experience 
with every mouthful might be difficult to cope with!   
 
Eaters and drinkers do not need sensual fireworks to choose among their foods and beverages 
and to be happy with them. Hedonism about food and drink is particularly unattractive if it 
relies on such strong sweetening that the infantile reflex overrides the normal dislike for that 
extreme.  Great enjoyment and full satisfaction can be obtained with an educated palate. 
Sweetness should take its adult place among other sensory characteristics, each at the level 
most liked by the individual for a particular product in use within a familiar situation. 
 
 
 31  
REFERENCES 
 
ASHBY, F.G., and ENNIS, D.M. 2002. A Thurstone-Coombs model of concurrent ratings 
with sensory and liking dimensions. J. Sensory Studies 17, 43-59. 
BARTOSHUK, L.M., SNYDER, D.J., and DUFFY, V.B. 2006. Hedonic gLMS: valid 
comparisons for food liking/disliking across obesity, age, sex and PROP status. Chem. Sens. 
31, A50.   
BERRIDGE, K.C. 1996. Food reward: brain substrates of wanting and liking. Neurosci. 
Biobehav. Rev. 90, 36-42.  
BOOTH, D.A. 1976. Approaches to feeding control.  In Appetite and food intake (T. 
Silverstone, ed.) pp. 417-478, Abakon / Dahlem Konferenzen, West Berlin, F.R.G.  
BOOTH, D.A. 1988a. Practical measurement of the strengths of actual influences on what 
consumers do: scientific brand design. J. Market Res. Soc. (U.K.) 30, 127-146. 
BOOTH, D.A. 1988b. Estimating JNDs from ratings. [Abstract: AChemS-10] Chem. Sens. 
13 (4), 675-676. 
BOOTH, D.A. 1990. Designing products for individual customers. In Psychological bases of 
sensory evaluation (R.L. McBride & H.J.H. MacFie, eds.) pp. 163-193, Elsevier Applied 
Science. London, UK  
BOOTH, D.A. 1991. Learned ingestive motivation and the pleasures of the palate. In The 
hedonics of taste (R.C. Bolles, ed.) pp. 29-58, Erlbaum, Hillsdale NJ. 
BOOTH, D.A. 1995. Cognitive processes in odorant mixture assessment. Chem. Sens. 20, 
639-643. 
BOOTH, D.A. 2009a. Lines, dashed lines and “scale” ex-tricks. Objective measurements of 
appetite versus subjective tests of intake. Appetite 53, 434-437. 
BOOTH, D.A. 2009b. The basics of quantitative judgment. How to rate the strength of 
appetite for food and its sating. Appetite 53, 438-441.   
BOOTH, D.A. 2014. Measuring sensory and marketing influences on consumers' choices 
among food and beverage product brands. Trends Food Sci. Technol. 35 (3), 129-137. 
BOOTH, D.A. 2015. Scientific measurement of sensory preferences using stimulus tetrads. J. 
Sensory Stud. in press. 
BOOTH, D.A., and BLAIR, A.J. 1989. Objective factors in the appeal of a brand during use 
by the individual consumer. In Food acceptability (D.M.H. Thomson, ed.) pp. 329-346,  
Elsevier Applied Science, London, U.K.  
 32  
BOOTH, D.A., and CONNER, M.T. 1991. Characterisation and measurement of influences 
on food acceptability by analysis of choice differences: theory and practice. Food Qual. Pref. 
2, 75-85. 
BOOTH, D.A., and CONNER, M.T. 2009. Salt in bread. J. Food Sci. 74(3), vii-viii.   
BOOTH, D.A., and FREEMAN, R.P.J. 1993. Discriminative feature integration by 
individuals.  Acta Psychol. (Amst.) 84, 1-16. 
BOOTH, D.A., and SHEPHERD, R. 1988. Sensory influences on food acceptance - the 
neglected approach to nutrition promotion. BNF Nutr. Bull. 13(1), 39-54. 
BOOTH, D.A., HIGGS, S., SCHNEIDER, J., and KLINKENBERG, I. (2010). Learnt liking 
versus inborn delight. Can sweetness give sensual pleasure or is it just motivating? Psychol. 
Sci. 21, 1656-1663.   
BOOTH, D.A., MATHER, P., & FULLER, J. (1982). Starch content of ordinary foods 
associatively conditions human appetite and satiation, indexed by intake and eating 
pleasantness of starch-paired flavours. Appetite 3, 163-184. 
BOOTH, D.A., MOBINI, S., EARL, T., and WAINWRIGHT, C.J. 2003a. Consumer-
specified instrumental quality of short-dough cookie texture using penetrometry and break 
force. J. Food Sci.: Sens. Nutr. Qual. Food 68, 382-387.  
BOOTH, D.A., MOBINI, S., EARL, T., and WAINWRIGHT, C.J. 2003b. Market-optimum 
instrumental values from individual consumers’ discriminations of standard sensory quality 
of the texture of short-dough biscuits.  J. Food Qual. 26(5), 425-439.  
BOOTH, D.A., O’LEARY, G., LI, L., and HIGGS, S. 2011a. Aversive viscerally referred 
states and thirst accompanying the sating of hunger motivation by rapid digestion of 
glucosaccharides. Physiol. Behav. 102, 373-381. 
BOOTH, D.A., SHARPE, O., and CONNER, M.T. 2011b. Discrimination without 
description of differences. Implicit or fully subconscious?  http://epapers.bham.ac.uk/682/ 
(accessed 18 March 2015)   
BOOTH, D.A., SHARPE, O., and CONNER, M.T. 2011c. Differential gustatory sensitivity 
to caffeine in normal use points to supertasters, tasters and non-tasters. Chemosens. Perc. 4, 
154-169.   
BOOTH, D.A., SHARPE, O., FREEMAN, R.P.J., and CONNER, M.T. 2011d. Insight into 
sight, touch, taste and smell by multiple discriminations from norm. See. Perc. 24, 485-511.  
BOOTH, D.A., THOMPSON, A.L. and SHAHEDIAN, B. 1983. A robust, brief measure of 
an individual's most preferred level of salt in an ordinary foodstuff. Appetite 4, 301-312.  
 33  
BOWMAN, S.J.,  BOOTH, D.A., PLATTS, R.G., and the UK Sjögren's Interest Group. 
2004. Measurement of fatigue and discomfort in primary Sjögren's syndrome using a new 
questionnaire tool.  Rheumatol. 43, 758-764. 
CABANAC, M. 1971. Physiological role of pleasure. Science 193, 1103-1107. 
CARDELLO, A., and SCHUTZ, H.G. 2004. Research note. Numerical scale-point locations 
for constructing the LAM (labeled affective magnitude) scale. J. Sensory Stud. 19, 341-346.  
CARDELLO, A., LAWLESS, H.T. and SCHUTZ, H.G. 2008. Effects of extreme anchors 
and interior label spacing on labeled affective magnitude scales. Food Qual. Pref. 19, 473-
480 
CARDELLO, A.V., SCHUTZ, H.G., SNOW, C., and LESHER, L. 2000. Predictors of food 
acceptance, consumption and satisfaction in specific eating situations. Food Qual. Pref.  11, 
201-216. 
CONNER, M.T., and BOOTH, D.A. 1988.  Preferred sweetness of a lime drink and 
preference for sweet over non-sweet foods, related to sex and reported age and body weight.  
Appetite 10, 25-35. 
CONNER, M.T., and BOOTH, D.A. 1992.  Combining measurement of food taste and 
consumer preference in the individual: reliability, precision and stability data.  J. Food Qual. 
15, 1-17.  
CONNER, M.T., BOOTH, D.A., CLIFTON, V.J., and GRIFFITHS, R.P. (1988a).  
Individualized optimization of the salt content of white bread for acceptability. J. Food Sci. 
53, 549-554. 
CONNER, M.T., HADDON, A.V., and BOOTH, D.A. (1986). Very rapid, precise 
measurement of effects of constituent variation on product acceptability: consumer sweetness 
preferences in a lime drink. Lebens.-Wiss. u. -Technol. [Food Sci. Technol.] 19, 486-490. 
CONNER, M.T., HADDON, A.V., PICKERING, E.S., and BOOTH, D.A. 1988b. Sweet 
tooth demonstrated: individual differences in preference for both sweet foods and foods 
highly sweetened. J. Appl. Psychol. 73, 275-280.   
CONNER, M.T., LAND, D.G., and BOOTH, D.A. 1987. Effects of stimulus range on 
judgments of sweetness intensity in a lime drink. Br. J. Psychol. 78, 357-364.  
CONNER, M.T., PICKERING, E.S., BIRKETT, R.J., and BOOTH, D.A. 1994. Using an 
individualised attribute tolerance model in consumer acceptability tests.  Food Qual. Pref.  5, 
225-232. 
 34  
CORDONNER, S.M., and DELWICHE, J.F. 2008. An alternative method for assessing 
liking.  Positional relative rating versus the 9-point hedonic scale.  J. Sensory Stud. 23, 284-
292.   
ELLERMEIER, W., and FAULHAMMER, G. 2000. Empirical evaluation of axioms 
fundamental to Stevens's ratio-scaling approach: I. Loudness production. Perc. Psychophys. 
62, 1505–1511.  
FINLAYSON, G., KING, N., and BLUNDELL, J.E. 2007. Is it possible to dissociate ‘liking’ 
and ‘wanting’ for foods in humans? A novel experimental procedure. Physiol. Behav. 90, 36-
42.  
FREEMAN, R.P.J., and BOOTH, D.A. 2010. Users of ‘diet’ drinks who think that sweetness 
is calories. Appetite 55, 152-155.  
FREEMAN, R.P.J., RICHARDSON, N.J., KENDAL-REED, M.S., and BOOTH, D.A. 1993. 
Bases of a cognitive technology for food quality. Br. Food J. 95(9), 37-44.   
GOODCHILD, C.E., PLATTS, R.G., TREHARNE, G.J., and BOOTH, D.A. 2005.  
Excessive negative affect and deficient positive affect in anxiety and depression: balancing 
the valences in the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS). Health Psychol. Update 
14(2), 45-50.  
GOODCHILD, C.E., TREHARNE, G.J., BOOTH, D.A., KITAS, G.D., and BOWMAN, S.J. 
2008. Measuring fatigue among women with Sjögren’s syndrome or rheumatoid arthritis: a 
comparison of the Profile of Fatigue (ProF) and the Multidimensional Fatigue Inventory 
(MFI). Musculoskel. Care 6, 31-48.   
HARRIS, G., and BOOTH, D.A. 1987.  Infants' preference for salt in food: its dependence 
upon recent dietary experience. J. Reprod. Infant Psychol. 5, 97-104. 
HOFMANN, W., VAN KONINGSBRUGGEN, G.M., STROEBE, W., RAMANATHAN, S., 
and AARTS, H. 2010. As pleasure unfolds: hedonic responses to tempting food. Psychol. Sci. 
21, 1863-1870.  
JAEGER, S.R., WAKELING, I.N., and MACFIE, H.J.H. 2000. Behavioural extensions to 
preference mapping: the role of synthesis. Food Qual. Pref. 11, 349-359. 
JONES, L.V., PERYAM, D.R., and THURSTONE, L.L. 1955.  Development of a scale for 
measuring soldiers’ food preferences. Food Res. 20, 512-520.  
KNIBB, R.C., SMITH, D.M., BOOTH, D.A., ARMSTRONG, A.M., PLATTS, R.G., 
MACDONALD, A., and BOOTH, I.W. 2001. No unique role of nausea attributed to eating a 
food in the recalled acquisition of sensory aversion to that food. Appetite 36, 225-234. 
MACHT, M. 2008. How emotions affect eating: a five-way model. Appetite 50, 1-11. 
 35  
 
LAURIER, E., and WIGGINS, S. 2011. Finishing the family meal. The interactional 
organisation of satiety. Appetite 36, 53-64. 
LAWLESS, H.T., CARDELLO, A.V., CHAPMAN, K. W., LESHNER, L.L., GIVEN, Z., 
and SCHUTZ, H.G. 2010a. A comparison of the effectiveness of hedonic scales and end-
anchor compression effects. J. Sensory Stud. 25, Supplement 1, 18-34.     
LAWLESS, H.T., POPPER, R., and KROLL, B.J. 2010b. A comparison of the labeled 
magnitude (LAM) scale, an 11-point category scale and the traditional 9-point hedonic scale.  
Food Qual. Pref. 21, 4-12. 
LAWLESS, H.T., SINOPOLI, D., & CHAPMAN, K.W. 2010c. A comparison of the labeled 
affective magnitude scale and the 9-point hedonic scale and examination of categorical 
behavior. J. Sensory Stud. 25, Supplement 1, 54-66.     
LIM, J. 2011. Hedonic scaling. A review of methods and theory. Food Qual. Pref. 22, 733-
747. 
MCBRIDE, R.L., and BOOTH, D.A. (1986). Using classical psychophysics to determine 
ideal flavour intensity. J. Food Technol. 21, 775-780. 
MOSKOWITZ, H. 2002. Knowledge building and optimization strategies for a product used 
in different carriers. J. Sensory Stud. 17, 327-349. 
MOSKOWITZ, H.R., and SIDEL, J.L. 1971. Magnitude and hedonic scales of food 
acceptability. J. Food Sci. 36, 677-680. 
MOTTRAM, D.S. 1998. Chemical tainting of foods. Int. J. Food Sci. Technol. 33, 19-29. 
NICOLAS, L., MARQUILLY, C., and O’MAHONY, M. 2010. The 9-point hedonic scale. 
Are words and numbers compatible?  Food Qual. Pref. 21, 1008-1015. 
PARDUCCI, A. 1965. Category judgment: a range-frequency model. Psychol. Rev. 72, 407-
418.  
PERYAM, D.R., and GIRADOT, N.F. 1952. Advanced taste test method. Food Eng. 24(7), 
58-61, 194.  
PERYAM, D.R., and HAYNES, J.G. 1957. Prediction of soldiers’ food preferences by 
laboratory methods. J. Appl. Psychol. 41, 2-6.  
PERYAM, D.R., and PILGRIM, F.J. 1957. Hedonic scale method of measuring food 
preferences. Food Technol. 11(September), 9-14.  
POULTON, E.C. 1989. Bias in quantifying judgments, Laurence Erlbaum Associates, Hove, 
U.K. 
 36  
RISKEY, D.R., PARDUCCI, A., and BEAUCHAMP, G.K. 1979. Effects of context on 
judgments of sweetness and pleasantness. Perc. Psychophys. 26, 171-176. 
ROSENSTEIN, D., and OSTER, H. 1988. Differential facial responses to four basic tastes in 
newborns. Child Dev. 59, 1555-1568. 
SAUTER, D. 2010. More than happy: the need for disentangling positive emotions. Curr. 
Dir. Psychol. Sci. 19, 36-40. 
SCHUTZ, H.G. (1965). A food action scale for measuring food acceptance. J. Food Sci. 30, 
365-374. 
SCHUTZ, H.G., and CARDELLO, A.V. 2001. A labeled affective magnitude (LAM) scale 
for assessing food liking/disliking.  J. Sensory Stud. 16, 117-159.   
STEINER, J.E., GLASER, D., HAWILO, M.E., and BERRIDGE, K.C. (2001). Comparative 
expression of hedonic impact: affective reactions to taste by human infants and other 
primates. Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 25, 53-74.  
STEVENS, S.S. (1957). On the psychophysical law. Psychol. Rev. 64, 153–181.  
THOMPSON, R.F., and SPENCER, W.A. (1966). Habituation: a model phenomenon for the 
study of neuronal substrates of behavior. Psychol. Rev. 73, 16–43. 
TORGERSON, W.S. 1958. Theory and methods of scaling. John Wiley, New York NY.  
WANSINK, B., BASCOUL, G., and CHEN, G.T. 2006. The sweet tooth hypothesis. How 
fruit consumption relates to snack consumption. Appetite 47, 107-110.   
 
 37  
TABLE 1.  CORRELATIONS OF RANKS FOR SCATTERPLOTS IN FIGURES 3-6. 
Correlation (Spearman’s ρ) between ratings of pleasure and displeasure or between one of 
those scores and Step numbers of sweetener that corresponded to scores for likelihood of 
choice (“always choose” to “never choose”, and worse than never, i.e. degrees of rejection).  
 
 
 
 Choices (Sweetener Steps) 
 
Pair of variables 
Always (0.1), 
Reject (3), 
Aversive (8) 
Always (0.1), 
Just Never (2), 
Strong Reject (4) 
Always (0.1), 
Just Never (2), 
Reject (3) 
Good Mood vs Nice Movement      0.86***         0.74***      0.50** 
Bad Mood vs Nasty Movement      0.77***     0.45*        0.67*** 
     Choice vs Good Mood   -0.46** -0.20  0.08 
     Choice vs Bad Mood    0.43**  0.03 -0.18 
          Mood, Good vs Bad     -0.69*** -0.30 -0.02 
     Choice vs Nice Movement -0.37* -0.15  0.18 
     Choice vs Nasty Movement    0.44** -0.03 -0.26 
          Movement, Nice vs Nasty     -0.80***      -0.89***       -0.76*** 
N 14 7 10 
 
*** P < 0.0005, ** P < 0.005, * P < 0.05, all two-tailed. 
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Titles of Figures, with subtitles and footnotes 
 
 
FIG. 1. INITIAL MEASUREMENT OF INDIVIDUALS’ PREFERENCES 
Each graph shows the raw data from one panelist fitted to the theoretical equation. 
 
Note. Each assessor’s four data-pairs were fitted to a right hyperbola (vertical conic section) 
by Co-Pro software (Booth and others 2011).  Continuous line (apple green): least squares fit.  
Broken lines (sky blue): tangents to the fitted hyperbola.  Horizontal axis: concentration of 
saccharin in the tasted sample in logarithms to the base 10 of grams per liter (equal ratios).  
Vertical axis: first (and only) response (R1) to each sample, with “always choose” scored as 
zero and “never choose” scored as -9. One panelist rated all four samples as “always choose” 
and so those data have been omitted from this Figure.   
 
 
 
FIG. 2. FREQUENCIES OF INDIVIDUALS’ DISCRIMINATED IDEAL POINTS 
The number of panelists (N = 18, Fig. 1) whose ideal range (ideal point ± one discrimination 
unit, HDR) included the indicated concentration of saccharin (in units of log10 g/l of tasted 
juice).   
 
Note . This frequency polygon does not have predetermined bins. The unit count for a 
particular panelist begins on the left at one HDR below IP and finishes on the right at one 
HDR above IP. Hence that person’s IP for saccharin in this context was at the unmarked 
concentration at the middle of that line for one increment in count.  
 
 
 
FIG. 3. CROSS-VALIDITIES OF GENERAL AND SWEET-SPECIFIC AFFECT 
Scatterplots of individuals’ ratings of general affect (good or bad mood) and sweet-specific 
affect (nice or nasty feeling of orofacial movement) in three subpanels (top, middle and 
bottom rows).  Compare with correlations in Table 1. 
[Note, over the page] 
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[Figure 3’s legends continued] 
Note. As indicated in brackets above each graph, each subpanel received a near-ideal level of 
saccharin (Step 0.1) and level fairly close to just rejected (Step 2 or 3).  The subpanels varied 
in the tested level above just rejected, from as far as Step 8 (top row) to as close as Step 3 
(bottom row), with Steps in concentration ratios of about 1.2.   
Left-hand column of graphs: pleasurable affect. Right-hand column: displeasure.   
Horizontal axes: change in general mood on tasting each sample, from no change (scored as 
zero) to “extreme” change (scored as 7).   
Vertical axes: how “nice” or “nasty” was any feeling of movement in the mouth (or face) on 
tasting the sample for one level of sweetness, from no affect (0) to “extreme” (7).   
Data points: two-letter ID codes of panelists. 
 
 
 
FIG. 4. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PLEASURE OR DISPLEASURE AND ACCEPTED 
OR REJECTED SWEETENER LEVELS, WITH ONE EXTREMELY STRONGLY 
REJECTED LEVEL 
Raw data from the individuals’ data in the uppermost subpanel of Figure 3 (N = 14), who 
were presented saccharin sweetener at Step 0.1 (near ideal), Step 3 (sweeter than the rejection 
point) or Step 8, a great way beyond rejection and also liable to taste bitter. 
 
Note.  Under these conditions (Booth and others 2010, and Figure 3 in this paper), pleasure 
(as distinct from preference) was indexed by positive affect (“good” mood) and by a concept 
of movement in the mouth or face that is pleasurable (“nice”), and displeasure by “bad” mood 
and a “nasty” felt movement.   
Bottom pair of graphs: at the extremely unpleasant level of saccharin (Step 8), both indexes 
of pleasure and displeasure were negatively correlated. 
Key to data points and vertical axes: see Note to Figure 3. 
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FIG. 5. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PLEASURE OR DISPLEASURE AND ACCEPTED 
OR REJECTED SWEETENER LEVELS, WITH ONE STRONGLY REJECTED LEVEL 
Ratings by individuals in the middle panel of Figure 3 (N = 7), presented saccharin at Step 
0.1 (near ideal), 2 (near rejection) and 4, well beyond rejection.  
 
Note. Bottom pair of graphs: at the clearly rejected level of saccharin (Step 4), pleasure and 
displeasure were negatively correlated but good and bad mood were not.  
Keys to data points and vertical axes are given in the Notes to Figures 4 and 3. 
 
 
 
FIG. 6. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PLEASURE OR DISPLEASURE AND ACCEPTED 
OR REJECTED SWEETENER LEVELS, WITH ONE LEVEL JUST REJECTED. 
Ratings from bottom subpanel in Figure 3 (N = 10), presented saccharin at Step 0.1 (near 
ideal), 2 (near rejection) and 3, just beyond rejection.   
 
Note. Bottom pair of graphs: at the level of saccharin on the border liking and dislike (Step 
3), neither pleasure and displeasure nor good and bad mood were substantially correlated.  
Key in Notes to Figures 3 and 4. 
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GOOD MOOD vs. NICE MOVEMENT
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GOOD MOOD vs. NICE MOVEMENT
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Sweetener Steps vs. Nasty Movement
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GOOD vs. BAD MOOD: top Step 8
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Sweetener Steps vs. Good Mood: top Step 4
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Sweetener Steps vs. Bad Mood: top Step 4
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Sweetener Steps vs. Nasty Movement: top Step 4
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GOOD vs. BAD MOOD: top Step 4
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0 1 2 3 4 5
B
a
d
 M
o
o
d
 (
0
 t
o
 7
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
CJRM
RS
SHL
SQ
TK
WR
CJ
RM
RSSHL
SQ
TK
WR
CJ
RM
RS
SHL
SQ
TK
WR
   
NICE vs. NASTY MOVEMENT: top Step 4
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Sweetener Steps vs. Good Mood: top Step 3
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Sweetener Steps vs. Nice Movement: top Step 3
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Sweetener Steps vs. Bad Mood: top Step 3
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Sweetener Steps vs. Nasty Movement: top Step 3
Sweetener (Step number)
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5
N
a
s
ty
 M
o
v
e
m
e
n
t 
(0
 t
o
 7
)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
BH
CP
EGHEDHJ
ND
RL
SK
SP
SPX
BH
CP
EGHED
HJ
ND
RL
SK
SP
SPX
BH
CP
EG
HED
HJ
ND
RL
SKPSPX
 75 
 76 
 77 
GOOD vs. BAD MOOD: top Step 3
Good Mood (0 to 7)
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